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ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
Introduction
Both the United States Constitution' and the California Constitu-
tion2 provide that private land shall not be taken for public use with-
out the payment of "just compensation." "Just compensation" is gen-
erally defined as "market value."8 Yet in practice, it is not infrequent
that a condemnor initially will offer a condemnee a price which is less
than the fair market value of his property.4 Often in such cases the
I U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
2 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14: "Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation having first been made to, or
paid into court for, the owner . . .which compensation shall be ascertained
by a jury, unless a jury be waived ......
3 "The 'just compensation' which is [constitutionally] guaranteed to the
owner whose property is to be taken or damaged for public use is its market
value .... ." Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 536, 28
P. 681, 683 (1891) (concurring opinion); accord, Metropolitan Water Dist. v.
Adams, 16 Cal. 2d 676, 680, 107 P.2d 618, 620 (1940); see United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1942); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Chubb, 24 Cal.
App. 365, 267, 141 P. 36 (1914); 4 P. NIcHOLs, THE LAW OF EMNENT DoMAmN
§§ 12.1[5], 12.31[2] (rev. 3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as NIcHOLS].
4 Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look into
the Practices of Condemnation, 67 CoLum. L. Rnv. 430 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as the Nassau County Study]. This study found that in Nassau County, New
York, only 15.7 percent of the negotiated settlements that were investigated
were for an amount equal to or greater than the lower of the county's two
appraisals. This is a result "that an impartial observer might consider a
sine qua non for 'just' compensation." Id. at 442. Of the negotiated settle-
ments, 56.9 percent were for an amount less than 90 percent of the amount of
the county's low appraisal. Id. at 443. In spite of New York's constitutional
guarantee of "just compensation," N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a), the county's
negotiators were instructed to settle at amounts which the authors concluded
were not to exceed 60 percent to 85 percent of the county's lower appraisal.
Nassau County Study at 445.
The study contrasts the results found in Nassau County with awards in
federal condemnation cases settled by negotiation. An Army Corps of Engi-
neers study found that one-fifth of the settlements were for less than the
Corps' appraisal, two-fifths were for more than the appraisal, and where dif-
ferences occurred, they generally were not very large. Id. at 458 n.60, citing
Hearings on Real Proprety Acquisition Practices and Adequacy of Compensa-
tion in Federal and Federally Assisted Programs Before the Select Subcomm.
on Real Property Acquisition of the House Comm. on Public Works, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., 368-81, 383-90 (1963); see Hearings on S. 1351 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 37-38 (1968) (testimony of Forrest Cooper and
Gordon Ramstead) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1351].
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landowner will consult an attorney.5 The greater the difference in
the parties' respective valuations of the land, the greater the likeli-
hood that the condemnee's attorney will render substantial services-
and thereafter present a sizeable bill to his client.6
Attorneys' fees generally have been allowed in condemnation
proceedings only in accordance with statutory provision.7 Unfortu-
nately, the legislatures of the various states and the federal govern-
ment have been reluctant to provide for reimbursing a condemnee for
his costs of litigation, even where the court's award is substantially
greater than the condemnor's highest pre-trial offer. The great ma-
jority of states have no legislation at all.8 Of those states that have
5 La Mesa-Spring Valley School Dist. v. Otsuka, 57 Cal. 2d 309, 317,
369 P.2d 7, 12, 19 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484 (1962) (dictum).
In the Nassau County Study, supra note 4, 57.5 percent of the landown-
ers were represented by an attorney. Of those represented, two-fifths were
self represented; thus, of every hundred lay condemnees, nearly 45 percent
retained attorneys.
6 Nelson v. State H'way Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1248, 1257, 115 N.W.2d 695,
700 (1962) (discussing the factors involved in the determination of a reason-
able attorney's fee). See also State ex rel. Public Works Bd. v. Westover Co.,
140 Cal. App. 2d 447, 449, 295 P.2d 96, 97 (1956) (allowance of attorneys'
fees in the amount of $150,000 to the condemnee in an abandoned comdem-
nation action).
7 La Mesa-Spring Valley School Dist. v. Otsuka, 57 Cal. 2d 309, 313, 369
P.2d 7, 10, 19 Cal. Rptr. 479, 481 (1962); 6 NicHoLs § 26.45, at 321-22, where
it is stated that "in the absence of bad faith or unreasonable delay upon the
part of the [condemnor] . . . the owner is not constitutionally entitled to
recover [attorneys' fees and other expenses], and, when the statutes are silent
on the subject, [none] will be awarded him." See aso, CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.
§ 1021: "Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute,
the measure and mode of compensation . . . is left to the agreement . .. of
the parties . .. ."
8 Hearings on S. 1351 at 57, where it is indicated in Appendix In that
34 states have no legislation at all on attorneys' fees in condemnation pro-
ceedings, and of the remaining 16 states, 11 deal only with abandonment.
APPENDIX IlI.-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATES STATUTES ON PAYMENT OF COSTS AND EXPENSES
Condemnor
pays when jury Condemnor
Condemnor's Payment when awards verdict pays when jury
Conditions on payment to payment at Condemnor condemnor equal to or awards verdict
Property owner discretion Always pays abandons larger than larger than
of court condemnation Government's Government's
last offer last offer
Elements of cost allowed owner:
Court costs ................ 12 States I... 1 State . 2 States ...... _ 10 States 4
Appraisers' fees ............. 5 States s... 2 States ...... 11 States ......................... 2 States 8
Expert witnesses ........ 4 States 9........................... 12 States 0........................... 3 States 1
Attorneys' fees .............. 3 States . ..... 13 States . ......... 2 States 14
Other expenses . ..... 2 States . .... 4 States . ..... 1 State 11




4 Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin.
5 Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Wyoming.
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made an effort, recovery of attorneys' fees is generally limited to only
a few specified expenses, and then only under some circumstancesY
For example, California has made provision for the payment of at-
torneys' fees only in the event of a statutory abandonment by the
condemnor;' 0 no provision has been made regarding attorneys' fees
in condemnation cases carried through to completion."
Consequently, following the announcement of the condemnor's
intent to condemn and the initial offer to purchase, the condemnee
will be prejudiced during any subsequent negotiations due to a fear
of incurring substantial litigation expenses in the event that he and
the condemnor are unable to reach a settlement. It is this fear that
compels many landowners to settle out of court for less than just
compensation: they wish to avoid what may be a greater loss occa-
sioned by a jury award of the fair market value, from which is to be
deducted the costs of the litigation.' 2 It is axiomatic that "just com-
pensation" less the costs of litigation no longer equals "just com-
pensation." It follows that any landowner who is forced into court
6 Iowa, Nebraska.
7 Alabama, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi, Maryland, Nevada, Now Jersey, New York, North Dakota, South
Carolina.
8 Oregon, Iowa.
9 California, Missouri, Minnesota, North Dakota.
10 Alabama, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Carolina.
11 Florida, Iowa, Oregon.
12 Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota.
13 Alabama, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina.
14 Florida, Oregon.
15 Missouri, Pennsylvania.
16 Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio.
17 New York.
9 Hearings on S. 1351 at 57 (Appendix III).
10 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1255a. See also, id. § 1255.
11 San Jose & A.R.R. v. Mayne, 83 Cal. 566, 570, 23 P. 522, 523 (1890);
Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Chubb, 24 Cal. App. 265, 141 P. 36 (1914); 4 NicHOLS
§ 14.249[4].
In the recent case of People ex rel. Department of Water Resources v.
Brown, 255 Cal. App. 2d 597, 63 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1967), it was stated that:
"There remains appellants' contention that 'attorney fees and reasonable
expenses incurred by a property owner in a condemnation case in the prepara-
tion of the defense of his case should be included as a part of just compen-
sation.' It is argued that article I, section 14, of the California Constitution,
which provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation, is self-executing and the cases holding
that attorneys fees and expenses are allowable only when authorized by
statute, are in error.
"Although appellants made a persuasive case for allowing attorneys fees
and expenses as 'just compensation,' the courts consistently have held they
are not recoverable in a condemnation action except where provided for by
statute, such as upon abandonment by the condemnor. We are not privileged
to disregard these cases. Consequently, we conclude that appellants are not
entitled to recover attorneys fees." Id. at 602, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (citations
omitted and emphasis added).
12 Hearings on S. 1351 at 10 (testimony of Senator Wayne Morse).
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to obtain a fair award is penalized the amount of his expenses of
litigation.'
3
This discrepancy between practice and constitutional edict will be
the basis of an examination of California's law relating to attorneys'
fees in condemnation proceedings. The areas wherein the greatest
injustices occur will be emphasized. Then the analysis will turn to
proposals for future legislation and the remedial effects that can be
expected should the proposed legislation be enacted.
California's Code of Civil Procedure Section 1255a
Section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure is the only California
statute allowing the condemnee to recover his attorneys' fees in con-
demnation proceedings. Under its terms, recovery is limited to in-
stances of statutory abandonment. 14 Section 1255a then continues:
Upon . . . abandonment . . . a judgment shall be entered dis-
missing the proceeding and awarding the defendants their recoverable
costs and disbursements. Recoverable costs and disbursements in-
clude (1) all expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in prepar-
ing for the condemnation trial, during the trial, and in any subse-
quent judicial proceedings in the condemnation action and (2) rea-
sonable attorney fees. . . where such fees were reasonably and neces-
sarily incurred to protect the defendant's interests in preparing for
the condemnation trial, during the trial, and in any subsequent ju-
dicial proceedings in the condemnation action, whether such fees were
incurred for services rendered before or after the filing of the com-
plaint.15
The rationale behind section 1255a was best expressed in the
leading case of Los Angeles v. Abbott.'6 The court stated that be-
fore the enactment of section 1255a in 1911, condemnors who felt
that the jury award in a particular case was excessive or unsatisfac-
tory "would abandon the action, pay the nominal [court] costs, retry
the action, and repeat this process until a satisfactory award was
arrived at.' 7 The court suggested that "[i] t was to remedy the evils
connected with a situation which permitted the condemnor to resort
to an action without seriously intending to prosecute it to a conclusion
that section 1255a was enacted."'
8
The condemnor's liability for the condemnee's expenses of litiga-
tion upon abandonment has been steadily broadened, both by amend-
ment to section 1255a' 9 and by judicial decision.20 in 1968 the statute
23 Id.
14 The abandonment must be in accordance with the terms of the statute.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255a(a). See note 37 infra.
15 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255a(c).
16 217 Cal. 184, 17 P.2d 993 (1932).
17 Id. at 200, 17 P.2d at 998.
18 Id.
19 Cal. Stats. 1911, ch. 208, § 1, at 377; (the original enactment of section
1255a); Cal. Stats. 1933, ch. 254, § 1, at 790; Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1613, § 9, at
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was amended to eliminate the requirement that the action be aban-
doned less than 40 days before trial in order that attorneys' fees
could be allowed.21 Section 1255a now provides that attorneys' fees
are recoverable upon abandonment any time after the filing of the
complaint.22 The justification for this change was offered in the re-
port of the California Law Revision Commission which initiated the
amendment.2 It suggested that
Section 1255a itself states the explicit policy that abondonment will
not be permitted if the condemnee "cannot be restored to substan-
tially the same position as if the proceeding had not been com-
menced." . . . To effectuate [this policy] the Commission recom-
mends that the 40-day limitation be deleted. That arbitrary limita-
tion should be replaced by a general requirement that, to be recov-
erable, any expense must be reasonably and necessarily incurred.
24
One unfortunate omission from both the Commission's recom-
mendation and the 1968 amendment is a provision allowing recovery
of attorneys' fees, upon abandonment, for litigation that is collateral
to but prior to the condemnation trial, e.g., an action for immediate
possession. As amended in 1968, section 1255a provides for attorneys'
fees incurred "in preparing for the condemnation trial, during the
trial, and in any subsequent judicial proceedings in the condemnation
action .... 125 Inglewood v. 0. T. Johnson Corp.28 construed section
1255a, prior to its 1968 amendment,27 as allowing recovery of attor-
neys' fees incurred in defending an action for immediate possession
where the condemnation was subsequently abandoned.28  The court
justified its holding by reasoning that the action for immediate posses-
sion was "part and parcel of the condemnation action." 29 It is sug-
gested that a provision allowing expenses in "related judicial proceed-
3449; Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 133, § 1, at 227 (the version of section 1255a presently
in force).
20 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Chubb, 24 Cal. App. 265, 141 P. 36
(1914); Los Angeles v. Clay, 126 Cal. App. 465, 14 P.2d 926 (1932); Inglewood
v. O.T. Johnson Corp., 113 Cal. App. 2d 587, 248 P.2d 536 (1952); La Mesa-
Spring Valley School Dist. v. Otsuka, 57 Cal. 2d 309, 369 P.2d 7, 19 Cal. Rptr.
479 (1962); Orange County Mun. Water Dist. v. Anaheim Union Water Co.,
247 Cal. App. 2d 761, 56 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1967).
21 Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 133, § 1, at 227.
22 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255a.
23 9 CAL. LAW REvisioN COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES
1365 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LAW REVIsION Comm'N REPORT].
24 Id. at 1366.
25 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1255a(c) (emphasis added).
26 113 Cal. App. 2d 587, 248 P.2d 536 (1952).
27 As effective in 1952, section 1255a provided for recovery of "all neces-
sary expenses incurred in preparing for trial and reasonable attorney fees."
Cal. Stats. 1933, ch. 254, § 1, at 790. Compare id. with CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc.
§ 1255a.
28 113 Cal. App. 2d at 592, 248 P.2d at 539.
29 Id. at 591, 248 P.2d at 538.
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ings" would be less troublesome and more just than the present pro-
vision. ° The statute as presently worded discloses neither legislative
approval nor disapproval of the Johnson holding. The ambiguity of
the more narrowly worded statute can accomplish little more than a
relitigation of the point3 1
Special Problems in California Condemnation Practice
Attorneys' Fees in Inverse Condemnation
3 2
In Frustuck v. Fairfax3 activity by a public agency was suf-
ficiently damaging to constitute inverse condemnation, but such activ-
ity was discontinued after the filing of a complaint. The plaintiff-
landowner then sought attorneys' fees under section 1255a of the
Code of Civil Procedure.3 4 The Frustuck court denied attorneys' fees
to the landowner upon discontinuance of the trespass, i.e., upon "aban-
donment" of the inverse condemnation.3 5
The reasoning of the Frustuck case is understandable. The right
to attorneys' fees upon abandonment of condemnation proceedings is
purely statutory,3 6 and the requirements of the statute must be met
before recovery will be allowed.3 7 The court found that the dis-
30 See, e.g., S. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967) (quoted in note 127 infra).
31 The California Law Revision Commission, in 9 LAW REvisiON Coamn'N
REPORT 1365, makes no mention of the Johnson case. It thereby leaves open
the question whether the wording of section 1255a(c) was narrowed inadver-
tently or with some legislative purpose in mind.
32 Inverse condemnation results when a public entity engages in activity
amounting to a wrongful taking or damaging of private property without
permission of the owner or effort to first compensate him, in consequence of
which he has been forced to initiate condemnation proceedings. Heimann v.
Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 753, 185 P.2d 597, 601 (1947). See also Frustuck
v. Fairfax, 230 Cal. App. 2d 413, 41 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1964).
33 230 Cal. App. 2d 413, 41 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1964).
34 Id. at 414, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 58. In Heimann v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal.
2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947), there was no claim of "abandonment," nor was
there an effort to recover attorneys' fees. Thus, these questions never came
before the Heimann court.
35 230 Cal. App. 2d at 418, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 60. The Frustuck court, in
considering the policy against construing section 1255a as allowing attorneys'
fees upon the abandonment of an action in inverse condemnation, said:
"[W]e do not believe that an intent of the Legislature is to be found which
would necessitate the rather difficult determination whether cessation of a
physical taking at various stages of an action in inverse condemnation was
voluntary or not. The test in an action in direct condemnation, whether dis-
continuance by the plaintiff condemner of its lawsuit was voluntary or was
required by judicial decree, is relatively simple." Id.
30 La Mesa-Spring Valley School Dist. v. Otsuka, 57 Cal. 2d 309, 313,
369 P.2d 7, 10, 19 Cal. Rptr. 479, 481 (1962) (see cases cited therein); CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255.
37 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1858. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Agardy, 1 Cal.
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continuance was not an abandonment under the traditional interpre-
tation38 of section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure.89  The Fru-
stuck court noted that Title VII of Part III of the Code, in which
section 1255a is contained, relates to condemnor-initiated proceedings;
there is no statement relating it to inverse condemnation.40  Further-
more, the court noted that section 1255a speaks not in terms of con-
demnor and condemnee, but rather of plaintiff and defendant.41 Thus
there was, the court concluded, provision under neither case law nor
statute allowing the plaintiff her attorneys', fees.4 2 The court added:
"No doubt the legislature could provide for the claimed allowances.
We conclude that it has not done so .... -43
It would be wise for the legislature to make such provision, not
only to provide for the plaintiff who institutes an action in inverse
condemnation, but also to encourage landowners whose property is
being taken to seek relief. Referring to ordinary court costs, the
California Supreme Court has said, "[i] n cases instituted by the prop-
erty owner the reason for allowing him costs in case of recovery is
even stronger than in [ordinary] condemnation cases .... ,44 It ob-
served that in the former there is neither offer of compensation nor a
suit to condemn, but only the wrongful taking.45 It is suggested that
this policy relating to costs in inverse condemnation should also be
applied to attorneys' fees, 46 and that provision should be made for
their recovery upon the abandonment of action amounting to inverse
condemnation. The justice of such a proposal is obvious: the injured
landowner, once forced into court to protect his property, would have
2d 76, 79, 33 P.2d 834, 835 (1934); Los Angeles v. Abbott, 217 Cal. 184, 197-98,
17 P.2d 997 (1932); Bell v. American States Water Serv. Co., 10 Cal. App.
2d 604, 607, 52 P.2d 503, 504 (1936), where "mere failure" to bring a condem-
nation action to trial two years after the filing of the complaint was held
not to constitute an abandonment under section 1255a of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
38 See cases cited in note 37 supra.
39 "The plaintiff may abandon the proceeding .... " CAL. CODE Crv.
PRoc. § 1255a (a) (emphasis added). Section 1255a(c) provides for "award-
ing the defendants their [expenses]." (Emphasis added). These provisions
were essentially the same in the statute as effective in 1964. Cal. Stats. 1961,
ch. 1613, § 9, at 3449.
40 230 Cal. App. 2d at 416, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
41 Id. at 418, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
42 The court could find no authority "[t]o convert the word 'defendant'
to 'condenmee,' who in an action in inverse condemnation would be the
plaintiff. . . ." 230 Cal. App. 2d at 416, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
43 Id. at 418, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
44 Heimann v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 753, 185 P.2d 597, 601 (1947).
45 Id. See also Frustuck v. Fairfax, 230 Cal. App. 2d 413, 41 Cal. Rptr.
56 (1964).
46 Section 1255a, as amended in 1968, includes attorneys' fees in the term
"recoverable costs." CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1255a(c).
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the security of knowing that he would either be recompensed for his
loss or recompensed for his reasonable expenses in the event of an
abandonment.
47
Attorneys' Fees When the Landowner Appears In Propria Persona4 s
Long Beach v. Sten49 was the first California case in which an
attorney-landowner, appearing on his own behalf, claimed attorneys'
fees upon an abandonment under section 1255a of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Sten court refused to allow attorneys' fees to the
landowner appearing in propria persona, but allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to his co-owner, to the extent of the latter's interest in
the land in question.50 The court argued that a lay condemnee is al-
lowed no remuneration for his time and anguish, and concluded that
the statute5' provided only for expenses paid or incurred, and that an
attorney representing himself had incurred no expense.52
It has been suggested that an attorney who is made the defendant
in a condemnation action "can protect himself by employing another
attorney to defend the action." 53 Here issue should be taken; attor-
neys' fees are not allowed the successful defendant under section
1255a, but only one whose case is abandoned.54 It is certainly no
protection to an attorney-landowner to require that if his case is not
abandoned (which is the usual case5 5), he will have to pay another for
work he could have done himself.
56
47 Regardless of the similarity between an action in tort and an action in
inverse condemnation, the latter involves such an extreme violation of prop-
erty rights that if the condemnor refuses to discontinue its actions until after
the landowner is driven to seek relief in court, then the putative condemnnor
should be required to pay the landowner's expenses if it then chooses to dis-
continue its wrongful actions.
48 In propria persona is defined as "[i]n one's own proper person."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 899 (4th ed. 1951). An example is when an attor-
ney-landowner appears as his own counsel.
49 206 Cal. 473, 274 P. 968 (1929). See also Los Angeles v. Moyer, 108
Cal. App. 4, 290 P. 1073 (1930) (dictum).
50 206 Cal. at 474, 274 P. at 969.
51 Section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure, as effective in 1929, pro-
vided for the recovery of "costs and disbursements, which shall include all
necessary expenses incurred in preparing for trial and reasonable attorney
fees." Cal. Stats. 1911, ch. 208, § 1, at 388.
52 206 Cal. at 474, 247 P. at 969.
53 17 CALiF. L. REv. 423, 424 (1929).
54 See notes 10 & 11 supra.
55 Baggot, First Interview With Client, in CALIFoRNIA CONDEMNATION
PRACTICE § 1.31 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1960).
G5 The importance of this question may be seen from the findings of the
Nassau County Study. Of the condemnees investigated, 57.5 percent were
represented by an attorney; and of those, two-fifths were self-represented.
Nassau County Study, supra note 5, at 451.
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A better policy would not discriminate against an attorney-land-
owner appearing in propria persona, but would allow him, as other
landowners, "reasonable attorney fees"57 upon the abandonment of a
direct condemnation proceeding under section 1255a. It also may be
argued that attorneys' fees are "incurred" by an attorney-landowner
who devotes his professional services to a case, although it is his own.
His only alternative is to pay another to represent him, and a rule
encouraging the unnecessary expenditure of money cannot be said to
be a desirable one. This is especially true considering the infrequency
of abandonments.
It should also be noted that the allowance of attorneys' fees con-
tra to the rule of the Sten case is not likely to increase litigation. The
attorney-landowner in a direct condemnation action is involuntarily
made defendant. He does not seek litigation, and asks nothing more
than "just compensation" for his land. Any effort to discourage a
jury trial for the purpose of determining the fair market value of the
land would violate the spirit of the California Constitution. 58
It is not suggested that the loss of time, the inconvenience, and
the mental anguish resulting from a condemnation proceeding be made
compensable upon abandonment. Not only would it be difficult to
assess damages for these items, but they may be said to be "conse-
quential" to the ownership of land.59 A rule allowing these expenses
might well lead to excessive claims against the condemnor who aban-
dons in good faith. Rather, it is suggested that the law should dis-
tinguish between items "consequential" to the ownership of land
(which are suffered by the attorney-landowner and lay-landowner
alike) and the "reasonable attorney fees" allowed upon abandonment
under section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure. To hold otherwise
only serves to discriminate unjustifiably against an attorney-land-
owner by denying him reasonable compensation for his professional
services, and cannot be said to decrease litigation or achieve justice.
Attorneys' Fees in Condemnation Proceedings That Are
Carried Through to Completion
Notwithstanding the constitutional guarantees of "just compen-
sation," 60 it generally has been held that a condemnee cannot recover
his attorneys' fees in a completed condemnation action whether it is
concluded in favor of the condemnor,61 in favor of the condemnor but
57 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1255a(c).
58 CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14; cf. note 67 infra.
59 Heimann v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 756, 185 P.2d 597, 603 (1947).
See also 4 NICHOLS §§ 14.24, 14.249[4].
60 See notes 1 & 2 supra.
61 San Jose & A.R.R. v. Mayne, 83 Cal. 566, 570, 23 P. 522, 523 (1890).
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with an increased award as per the contention of the condemnee,'6 2 or
in favor of the condemnee with a dismissal of the action.0 3 It is set-
tled that "the acquisition of property by eminent domain does not in-
volve a taking of the legal services which are needed in order to estab-
lish a claim for compensation."'6 4 Furthermore, attorneys' fees gen-
erally have not been allowed under "statutory provisions for costs,
expenses, or just compensation."65
Still, courts have noted the injustice done when a landowner is
denied his expenses of litigation. One example is the leading case of
San Francisco v. Collins:
6
6
To require the defendants in this case to pay any portion of their costs
necessarily incidental to the trial of the issues on their part, or any
part of the costs of the [condemnor], would reduce the just compen-
sation awarded by the jury, by a sum equal to that paid by them for
such costs.
0 7
02 Binghamton cx Tel. Urban Renewal Agency v. Chenango Enterprises,
48 Misc. 2d 430, 434, 265 N.Y.S.2d 135, 140 (1965), where the court allowed the
defendant 5 percent of the award for "costs" under N.Y. CoNDm). LAw § 16
(2) (McKinney 1950), but limited the allowance of costs to the amount pre-
scribed by the statute. Reasonable attorneys' fees were not allowed.
03 Los Angeles v. Abbott, 217 Cal. 184, 197-98, 17 P.2d 993, 996-97 (1932);
Coburn v. Townsend, 103 Cal. 233, 235-36, 37 P. 202, 203 (1894); Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Chubb, 24 Cal. App. 265, 269-70, 141 P. 36, 37-38 (1914). See
also 4 NICHOLS § 14.249 [4].
64 4 NicHoLs § 14.249[4]. See also People ex rel. Department of Water
Resources v. Brown, 255 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602, 63 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1967).
05 Id. See, e.g., San Francisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259, 33 P. 56 (1893)
(costs). See also note 8 supra.
0 98 Cal. 259, 33 P. 56- (1893).
07 Id. at 262, 33 P. at 57. The Collins case was decided before the enact-
ment of section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court dealt only
with the problems of ordinary costs; the issue of attorneys' fees was not
raised.
Another excellent discussion of the constitutional right to just compensa-
tion undiminished by costs is found in In re New York City, 125 App. Div.
219, 109 N.Y.S. 652, aff'd without opinion, 192 N.Y. 569, 85 N.E. 1117 (1908).
The court said:
"The [New York] Constitution [article I, section 7 (a)] requires that pri-
vate property shall not be taken for public purposes except on the payment of
"just compensation," and a man who is forced into court, where he owes no
obligation to the party moving against him, cannot be said to have received
"just compensation" for his property if he is put to an expense appreciably
important to establish the value of his property. He does not want to sell;
the property is taken from him through the exercise of the high powers of the
State, and the spirit of the Constitution clearly requires that he shall not be
compelled to part with what belongs to him without the payment, not alone
of the abstract value of the property, but of all the necessary expenses in-
curred in fixing that value. This would seem to be dictated by sound morals
as well as by the spirit of the Constitution .... " 125 App. Div. at 222, 109
N.Y.S. at 654 (emphasis added).
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The policy enunciated in the Collins case has not generally been ap-
plied to attorneys' fees in condemnation cases. Only four states allow
a condemnee to recover his attorneys' fees in all cases where he has
not been offered "just compensation" prior to the condemnor's filing




Florida's provisions regarding attorneys' fees in condemnation
provisions are the most liberal found in any state. Its statutes pro-
vide:
The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings
in the [trial] court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be asses-
sed by that court.
72
The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in
the appellate court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be as-
sessed by that court, except upon appeal taken by a defendant in
which the judgment of the trial court shall be affirmed. 73
The Florida constitutional provisions regarding eminent domain 7
4
68 Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108 So. 2d
289 (Fla. 1959).
69 United Dev. Corp. v. State H'way Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1965).
70 Nelson v. State H'way Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962).
71 State ex reL State H'way Comm'n v. Kendrick, 227 Ore. 608, 363 P.2d
1078 (1961). Several other states have less complete provisions. New York,
for example, allows a condemnee his court costs, plus an additional five per-
cent of the ultimate award in the discretion of the court, if the ultimate award
exceeds the condemnor's highest pre-trial offer. Board of Supervisors v.
Sherlo Realty, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 579, 224 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd,
19 App. Div. 2d 590, 240 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1963), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1172, 248
N.Y.S.2d 52, 197 N.E.2d 540 (1964); N.Y. CoNDmw. LAW § 16 (McKinney 1950).
Michigan allows attorneys' fees in condemnation proceedings, but a limit
of $25 placed on recovery diminishes the worth of the statute. The Michigan
law dealing with condemnation by state agencies and public corporations pro-
vides that "it shall be lawful for the judge in any case to order payment by
the petitioner to any respondent of such reasonable attorney fee as he may
deem just, not exceeding 25 dollars .... " MCH. Com. LAws § 213.37
(1967). Similar provisions deal with condemnation by municipal corpora-
tions, id. §§ 213.89-.132, and for highway purposes, id. § 213.190. See Muske-
gon v. Slater, 379 Mich. 466, 152 N.W.2d 652 (1967) (limiting recovery of
attorneys' fees to $25). Recovery of attorneys' fees in condemnation pro-
ceedings by the county, id. § 123.781, and by power companies, id. § 486.252g,
is allowed without limit, so long as the allowance is reasonable. Petition of
Detroit Edison Co., 350 Mich. 606, 87 N.W.2d 126 (1958).
72 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.091 (Supp. 1965).
73 Id. § 73.131(2).
74 "[N]or shall private property be taken without just compensation."
FLA. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 12. "No private property ... shall be
appropriated ... until full compensation therefor shall be first made to the
owner . . . " Id. art. XVI, § 29.
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are substantially the same as those in the California Constitution.7 5
Yet the Florida Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest that the
Florida constitutional provisions for "just compensation" are in fact
self-executing, and has indicated that it would allow recovery of at-
torneys' fees even without statutory authority.7 6 Thus the attitudes
of Florida's judiciary and legislature clearly suggest that, at least in
that state, the measure of "just compensation" should in no instance
be diminished by the necessary costs of a good-faith litigation of the
question of fair market value. This is true even though the condem-
nee may have been offered what is later determined to be "just com-
pensation" before the filing of the complaint.
It has been suggested that provisions far less generous than the
Florida laws would lead to increased (and unnecessary) litigation.
77
And, it is clear that a condemnee does not risk the enormous expenses
of litigation in Florida that he does in other states. Yet the incon-
venience and delay of litigation, when considered with the fact that a
court cannot award more than "just compensation,"7 8 evidently suf-
75 CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 14.
78 Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108 So.
2d 289, 294 (Fla. 1959).
77 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1351, supra note 4, at 22-24; id. at 50 (letter
from Warren Christopher, Deputy Attorney General, to Senator James East-
land, April 5, 1968); id. at 51 (letter from Aubrey Wagner, Chairman, TVA,
to Senator James Eastland, April 18, 1968).
78 Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution pro-
vides for "just compensation." Under a similar provision in the New York
Constitution, the researchers in the Nassau County Study found that of those
cases where the award was determined by a court, 32.3 percent received an
amount higher than, 49.6 percent an amount equal to, and 18.1 percent an
amount less than the county's lowest appraisal. Nassau County Study, supra
note 4, at 450 (Table 13). This would indicate that the awards of a trial court
would generally not exceed an offer of the county's mean appraisal value; or,
in other words, that a trial after an offer of just compensation would be a
waste of time for both parties. As was noted by the authors of the Nassau
County Study: "What do we derive from the trial statistics? First, that the
claimant did not automatically find the Nassau County courtroom paved with
gold; he who refused a 'fair settlement' gambled unwisely. Second, that the
County had no reason to view its trial prospects glumly; to have settled much
beyond a solid appraisal simply to avoid trial would have been unwarranted
most of the time. Third, that the claimant who sought not a windfall but
only a decent recovery was far likelier to achieve this from a court than from
the County's negotiator." Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
The study revealed that of those cases not decided in court, 9.1 percent
received an amount higher than, 6.6 percent an amount equal to, and 84.4
percent an amount less than the county's lowest appraisal. Id. at 442 (Table
10) (figures rounded off). Comparing these results with those where the
award was determined by a court, and assuming that the practices in Nassau
County are not dissimilar from those of most condemnors, the fairness of the
Florida system, which enables a condemnee to insist on a trial without fear of
burdensome litigation expenses, is manifest.
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fice to discourage unjustified litigation in Florida.
There is a marked absence of criticism of this policy in the legal
literature of Florida. Rather, both the judiciary 9 and the legal writ-
ers80 express consistent approval of Florida's policy, and not only has
the legislature continued this policy, but it has broadened its scope
through successive reorganizations and amendments of the statutes."'
This absence of criticism and presence of praise regarding the Florida
provisions can only dispel the arguments of critics8 2 who claim that
such legislation would bankrupt condemnors and shift the scale too
far in favor of the condemnee.
North Dakota
North Dakota allows a condemnee his reasonable attorneys' fees
in the discretion of the trial court.8 3 A condemnee also may recover
79 E.g., Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108
So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1958) (Drew, J.) (concurring opinion): "The fact that
the sovereign is now engaged in great public enterprises necessitating the
acquisition of large amounts of private property at greatly increasing costs is
no reason to depart from the firmly established principle that under our sys-
tem the rights of the individual are matters of the greatest concern to the
courts. The powerful government can usually take care of itself; when the
courts cease to protect the individual-within, of course, constitutional and
statutory limits-such individual rights will be rapidly swallowed up and
disappear in the maw of the sovereign. If these immense acquisitions of land
point to anything, it is to the continuing necessity in the courts of seeing to it
that, in the process of improving the general welfare, individual rights are
not completely destroyed."
Though the point in issue was the allowance of moving expenses, the
applicability of this dictum to attorneys' fees speaks for itself. Justice Drew
joined in the supplementary opinion allowing the condemnee his attorneys'
fees. Id. at 294.
80 E.g., Sheppard, Compensation in Florida Condemnation Proceedings,
14 U. FLA. L. REV. 28, 47 (1961); see id. at 44-45 (explaining the policy).
81 E.g., Fla. Laws 1901, ch. 5017, § 13; Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20304, § 5; id. ch.
20930, § 16; Fla. Laws 1963, chs. 63-281, § 1, ch. 63-282, § 1; Fla. Laws 1965,
ch. 65-369, § 1.
82 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1351, supra note 4, at 50 (letter from Warren
Christopher, Deputy Attorney General, to Senator James Eastland, April 5,
1968) (discussing S. 1351); id. at 51 (letter from Aubrey Wagner, Chairman,
TVA, to Senator James Eastland, April 18, 1968) (discussing S. 1351).
83 Morton County Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Wetsch, 142 N.W.2d 751, 752-53
(N.D. 1966); Morton County Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Wetsch, 136 N.W.2d
158, 159-60 (N.D. 1965); United Dev. Corp. v. State H'way Dep't., 133 N.W.2d
439, 445-47 (N.D. 1965).
"The court may in its discretion award to the defendant reasonable actual
or statutory costs or both which may include reasonable attorney's fees. In
all cases when a new trial has been granted upon the application of the
defendant and he has failed upon such trial to obtain greater compensation
than was allowed him upon the first trial, the costs of such new trial shall be
taxed against him." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-32 (1960).
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his attorneys' fees for any subsequent judicial proceedings, except
when the new trial results in an award no greater than that of the
prior proceeding.8 4
The North Dakota provisions may be criticized in that they do not
establish a simplified procedure to make the initial determination of
"just compensation." However, the simplicity and the inclusiveness
of the North Dakota costs statute are its most favorable aspects.
Iowa
The Iowa provisions for attorneys' fees in condemnation cases,
8 5
though less generous than the Florida provisions, are adequate. Iowa
provides for a condemnation commission to determine the value of the
land to be taken.86 It then allows a condemnee his attorneys' fees in-
curred in an appeal to the district court87 for a trial de novo88 if the
award exceeds that of the commissioners. 9 However, in exchange
for the benefits of Iowa's commission procedure, the Iowa condemnee
must bear his own attorneys' fees incurred during the commission
hearing.90
Oregon
The Oregon statutes dealing with attorneys' fees in condemnation
proceedings are complex. There are statutes providing for condem-
nation by the state91 and by several of its agencies; 92 but a general
statute for recovery of costs applies in those cases where the special
statutes do not.93 The general statute reads:
84 N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-32 (1960).
85 IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.33 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
86 Id. § 472.4. The prescribed condemnation procedure is treated in id.
§§ 472.1 to -.41.
87 Id. § 472.18.
88 Id. § 472.21.
89 Nelson v. State H'way Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1248, 1257, 115 N.W.2d 695,
700 (1962).
"The applicant shall pay all costs of the assessment made by the com-
missioners. The applicant shall also pay all costs occasioned by the appeal,
including reasonable attorney fees to be taxed by the court, unless on the
trial thereof the same or a less amount of damages is awarded than was
allowed by the tribunal from which the appeal was taken." IowA CODE ANN.
§ 472.33 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
90 IowA CODE ANw. § 472.33 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
91 ORE. REv. STAT. § 281.250 (1967).
92 E.g., id. §§ 281.330, 281.550, 366.380(9), 722.055 (counties, municipal
corporations, state highway commission, private corporations). It should also
be noted that Oregon provides for attorneys' fees upon abandonment, id. §
35.105(1), and for inverse condemnation, id. § 20.085.
93 State ex rel. State H'way Comm'n v. Kendrick, 227 Ore. 608, 612, 363
P.2d 1078, 1080 (1961) (dictum).
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The costs and disbursements of the defendant, including a reason-
able attorney's fee to be fixed by the court at the trial, shall be taxed
by the clerk and recovered from the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff
tendered the defendant before commencing the action an amount equal
to or greater than that assessed by the jury, in which case the plain-
tiff shall recover his costs and disbursements from the defendant, but
not including an attorney's fee.94
Contrast this with the Oregon provision dealing with condemnation
by a county:
• . . but if it appears that the county tendered to the defendant be-
fore commencing the action an amount equal to or greater than that
assessed by the jury, the defendant shall not recover costs or attor-
ney's fee.9 5
It is suggested that the latter is a more desirable provision than the
former in that it does not assess the condemnee the amount of the
condemnor's expenses. However, even the latter statute may well in-
fringe upon the prohibition in San Francisco v. Collins,"6 as a con-
demnee proceeding in good faith might be forced to bear his ordinary
costs in addition to attorneys' fees.
Attorneys' Fees in English Condemnation Proceedings
The English law relating to attorneys' fees in condemnation cases
has been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England:
The Lands Tribunal [97] may, subject to the provisions mentioned
hereafter, order that the [attorneys' fees9s in] any proceedings before
it incurred by any party are to be paid by any other party and may
tax or settle the amount of any costs ordered to be paid or direct the
manner in which they are to be taxed. Where the acquiring authority
has made an unconditional offer of any sum as compensation to any
claimant and the tribunal awards a sum not exceeding that offered,
the tribunal must, unless for special reasons it thinks proper not to do
so, order the claimant to bear his own costs and pay the costs of the
acquiring authority incurred after the offer was made.... [99]
Where the claimant has made an unconditional offer ... to ac-
cept [a]ny sum as compensation and . . . the sum awarded is equal
to or exceeds the sum which the claimant offered to accept, the tri-
bunal must, unless for special reasons it thinks proper not to do so,
order the acquiring authority to bear its own costs and to pay the
costs of the claimant incurred after the offer was made.[o9]
94 ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.110 (1967).
96 Id. § 281.330(2).
96 See text accompanying notes 66 & 67 supra.
97 Jurisdiction in most English condemnation cases was conferred upon
the Lands Tribunal in the Land Compensation Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c.
33, § 1. See also 10 HALSBURY, THE LAws OF ENGLAND 111 424-30 (rev. 3d ed.
1955) [hereinafter cited as HALSBURY].
98 "Costs" of. proceedings are defined as including attorneys' fees. 11
HALSBURY f 482; 34 id. f 218; see cases cited note 101 infra.
99 Land Compensation Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 33, § 4(1)(a). This
provision would violate the constitutional guarantees of "just compensation."
See notes 102 & 103 infra.
100 Land Compensation Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 33, § 4(3). This
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In other cases the costs of and incidental to any proceedings are
in the discretion of the tribunal.' 0 '
It is clear that the English rule under which the condemnee would
pay the costs of the condemnor if the trial award did not exceed the
condemnor's final offer would not be sustained under either the Cali-
fornia'0 2 or Federal Constitutions. 0 3 With this exception, it appears
that the English rules are fair and would encourage the condemnor to
offer the condemnee his full measure of "just compensation," without
causing frivolous litigation.
The Proposed Model Eminent Domain Code
A Model Eminent Domain Code is under consideration by the
Committee on Condemnation Law of the Real Property, Probate and
Trusts Section of the American Bar Association. The initial result of
the Committee's deliberations was a tentative draft of the Model
Eminent Domain Code. 0 4 Adoption of the Code would result in a
considerable improvement in the condemnation law of nearly all
American jurisdictions.
The Code establishes a condemnation commission in each
county,10 5 which the court may direct, at the request of either party,
to determine the value of any property included in the declaration of
taking. 00 The commission proceeding would be relatively in-
formal,'10 7 and presumably less costly and more rapid than a compar-
provision would violate the constitutional guarantees of "just compensation."
See notes 102 & 103 infra.
101 10 HALSBURY ff 328, at 181. The English provision is Lands Tribunal
Rules of 1963, STAT. INST. 1963, No. 483.
In London City Council v. Tobin, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 354, 368, 371 (C.A.),
the court held that legal fees reasonably and properly incurred by a claimant
in preparing his claim for compensation for the compulsory acquisition of his
land should be included in the compensation awarded. Accord, Hull &
Humber Inv. Co. v. Hull Corp. [1965] 2 Q.B. 145, 166 (C.A.).
102 San Francisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259, 262-63, 33 P. 56, 57 (1893);
San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50, 67-68, 25 P. 997, 981-82
(1891); Burbank v. Nordahl, 199 Cal. App. 2d 311, 18 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962),
where the court said: "Under the general rule, a condemnee may not be re-
quired to pay any part of the trial costs of the condemner. To the extent §
394 [of the Code of Civil Procedure] provides otherwise, when applied to
an action in eminent domain, it is unconstitutional." Id. at 331, 18 Cal. Rptr.
at 722 (citations omitted).
103 4 NICHOLS § 14.249; Hearings on S. 1351, supra note 4, at 23-24 (testi-
mony of Senator Wayne Morse); id. at 34 (testimony of Forrest Cooper);
id. at 42-43, 44 (testimony of Roland Boyd).
104 ABA MODEL EumNENT Dom iN CODE (Preliminary Draft, 1967), in 2
REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 365 (1967).
105 MODEL EMnENT DoMInm CODE § 401.
10 Id. § 503.
t07 Id. § 701.
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able trial. It could be appealed'08 or eliminated'0 9 on motion of either
party. In either case the result would be a trial de novo." 0
Attorneys' Fees Under the Code
Section 504E of the Code is the only provision dealing with attor-
neys' fees. It reads:
Where the ultimate award is more than the offer of the condemnor,
the Trial Judge shall have the authority to cause the condemnor to
reimburse the [condemnee for his] ... attorney's fees and other
reasonable expense, but his authority shall exist only in those in-
stances where the Trial Judge finds affirmatively that to do other-
wise would invoke serious hardship on the condernnee .... "I
This provision limits the allowance of attorneys' fees to instances
where the ultimate award exceeds the tender offer." 2 The restric-
tion is an appropriate method of preventing a condemnnee from
creating unnecessary litigation after once receiving an offer of "just
compensation."
However, the provision then goes on to place an undesirable
restriction on the discretion of the trial court. It requires an affirm-
ative finding of "serious hardship" as a prerequisite to the allowance
of attorneys' fees. Such language is vague, and provides no stand-
ards for determining what constitutes "serious hardship."" 3 There
is no valid reason for including such a restriction in section 504E of
the Code. The first part of the provision quoted above is intended to
encourage the condemnor to offer "just compensation" to the con-
demnee before litigation. The substance of the second part is that if
the condemnor does not, it will have to bear the burden of the con-
demnee's attorneys' fees, but only if the court finds the existence of
something called "serious hardship." It would be better to provide
that if the award exceeds the 'condemnor's offer, the condemnor shall
pay the condemnee's expenses of litigation, unless in the opinion of
108 Id. § 504A.
109 See id. § 502 (by agreement of the parties).
110 Id. § 504A.
111 Id. § 504E.
3.12 The condemnor is required to make a prior effort to acquire the
land in question by purchase. Id. § 302. If this effort fails, the offer price is
then used to determine the party upon which the burden of the condemnee's
expenses of litigation should fall. Id. § 504E.
113 COMMENTS, CRICISMS & SUGGESTIONS ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT,
MODEL CODE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 74 (unpublished report of ABA Committee
on Condemnation Law, Real Property, Probate & Trusts Section, Aug. 1968)
(comment by Hodge L. Dolle, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Committee Com-
ments], on file in Hastings Law Library.
John H. Champagne suggests that the provision, as it now stands, would
allow the court to find "serious hardship" where the condemnee could con-
vince the court that he is poor rather than wealthy. Id. at 75.
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the court it would not be in the interests of justice to do so."
4 If
reworded in this manner, section 504E would not tend to defeat the
very purpose for which it was created-to encourage the condemnor
to make a fair offer to the condemnee before commencing litigation.11 5
Additional Criticisms of the Code
Section 504E also provides for expenses in an abandoned condem-
nation action: "The condemnee shall be entitled to be reimbursed
for all reasonable expenses actually expended when the condemnor
withdraws therefrom." Suggestions regarding this provision are lim-
ited to its wording. To allow recovery of expenses "actually incurred"
(rather than "actually expended") would eliminate possible litigation
as to the time at which expenses are "expended."' 1 6 And to allow the
expenses when the condemnor "abandons the proceeding" (rather
than when he "withdraws therefrom") would be more in line with
the language of modern decisions 17 and statutes." 8
The positioning of section 504E in the Code creates an additional
ambiguity. Section 503, dealing with the commission hearing, is com-
pletely silent as to costs. The wording of section 504E is silent as to
the extent of its scope; the language of the section does not disclose
whether its provisions are meant to apply to attorneys' fees incurred
during and in preparation for the commission hearing, or in appeals
(under section 504H)119 subsequent to the trial de novo provided in
section 504A.120 This ambiguity should be removed, and a clear posi-
tion taken concerning the extent to which attorneys' fees will be al-
lowed.
Another criticism of the Code is that it is unclear regarding the
114 It might not be in the interests of justice to allow a condemnee his
attorneys' fees when, for example, the difference between the tender offer
and the award is negligible, or when this difference is very small as compared
with the expense of the litigation.
115 The importance of this goal can be seen from the results of the
Nassau County Study, supra note 4. Only 15.7 percent of the negotiated
settlements were for an amount equal to or greater than the lower of the
county's two appraisals. Id. at 442, 443 (Table 11). If it can be assumed that
negotiation resulted in an improvement over the condemnor's original offer in
at least some of the cases, then less than 15.7 percent of the condemnor's
offers were "fair."
116 CommiTTEE CoMMENTs 75 (comment of Albert J. Horrell).
117 E.g., La Mesa--Spring Valley School Dist. v. Otsuka, 57 Cal. 2d 309,
369 P.2d 7, 19 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1962).
118 E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255a.
119 "Either party may appeal to the proper appellate court ... M" ODEL
EMIENT DOMAIn CODE § 504H.
120 "Any party aggrieved by the decision of the Commission may appeal
to the Court in which the declaration of taking has been filed .... The right
to appeal shall be absolute and the trial shall be de novo .... " Id. § 504A.
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allowance of attorneys' fees in successful inverse condemnation ac-
tions. Section 505A of the Code provides that the inverse condemna-
tion action shall be as similar as possible to the direct condemnation
action. 12 1 However, section 505F, the provision dealing with costs in
inverse condemnation, allows "taxable costs" but fails to mention at-
torneys' fees. 22 On the other hand, section 504E, the provision deal-
ing with costs in direct condemnation, allows taxable costs,'123 but
also provides specifically for attorneys' fees. 24 A reasonable inter-
pretation of this construction would indicate that attorneys' fees are
not included within the term "taxable costs." Thus, the Code, by its
own terms, has prevented the inverse condemnation action from being
as close as possible to the direct condemnation action.
It is suggested that section 505F 2 5 should be amended to allow
attorneys' fees upon both the successful completion of an inverse
condemnation action and upon an abandonment of the wrongful activ-
ity by the putative condemnor. This would be consistent with the
direction of the Code in that condemnees in both direct and inverse
condemnation would be accorded the same protection with respect to
attorneys' fees.
Senate Bill 1351
On March 21, 1967, Senator Wayne Morse introduced Senate Bill
1351, a bill providing for attorneys' fees in federal condemnation ac-
tions.126 The bill adds section 2415 to title 28 of the United States
Code. 2 7 The bill is a relatively thorough one. The substantive pro-
121 "In [inverse condemnation], the same proceeding shall be had as near
as may be, as provided [for the appeal from the Commission decision in a
direct condemnation action]." Id. § 505A.
122 "For the purpose of this section, all taxable costs shall be paid by
the putative condemnor as provided in Section 504E unless it is found upon
trial that there has been no taking. In such case, costs may be taxed to the
owner as the Court in the interest of justice may allow." Id. § 505F.
123 "All taxable costs, including filing fees, jury fees, statutory witness
fees and mileage, expense of preparing plans ... the expense of transporting
the Judge and jury to view the condemned property and such other costs as
the Court in the interest of justice may allow shall be paid by the condemnor."
MODEL EimNqNT DoMAIN CODE § 504E.
124 The provision limits the recovery of expenses to actions in which the
condemnee is successful in his contention that he is being denied "just com-
pensation." Id.
125 See note 122 supra.
126 113 CoNG. REc. S. 4122 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1967).
127 (a) If, in any action brought by the United States for the acqui-
sition of any interest in real property [under] eminent domain, it is
determined that just compensation for such interest exceeds the max-
imum amount offered by the United States for such interest before
the institution of that action, any judgment entered in favor of the
United States . .. shall provide for the payment to the defendant
... of (1) the amount determined to constitute just compensation
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visions (1) allow expenses to the landowner if the court award ex-
ceeds the last pretrial offer of the condemnor, (2) allow the condemnee
his expenses in the event of an abandonment, and (3) allow the con-
demnee his expenses in a successful action in inverse condemnation.
Regrettably, the bill makes no provision for abandonment of an in-
verse condemnation by the putative condemnor; the provision allow-
ing expenses upon abandonment in subsection (a) (which treats direct
condemnation) is not included in subsection (c) (which treats inverse
condemnation).128 It is suggested that the addition of such a pro-
vision would be desirable. And since no speech or testimony on Sen-
ate Bill 1351 indicates any intent to deny the putative condemnee his
expenses upon a discontinuance of the wrongful activity by the puta-
tive condemnor, the issue most probably was not considered.
Nevertheless, proposed section 2415 (a) 129 incorporates many of the
better features of English and American law concerning the allowance
of attorneys' fees in condemnation proceedings. It allows the land-
owner all his reasonable expenses if he was not offered "just compen-
sation" before being taken into court, but forces him to bear the bur-
den of his expenses if it is found that he was tendered "just com-
pensation" but refused to accept it.
Criticism of Senate Bill 1351
As was noted in the hearings of Senate Bill 1351, the prime ob-
jection to a provision allowing attorneys' fees in a completed con-
and (2) a sum equal to the aggregate amount of the costs and
expenses incurred by such defendant incident to that action. If, after
the institution of any action, the United States dismisses such action
the court shall enter ... judgment requiring the payment by
the United States to such defendant of a sum equal to the aggregate
amount of the costs and expenses incurred by such defendant inci-
dent to that action.
Cc) if, in any action brought against the United States for the re-
covery of just compensation for the taking of any interest in real
property, it is determined that such taking occurred without a tender
of consideration to the plaintiff for such interest or that just compen-
sation for the interest taken exceeds the maximum amount tendered
to the plaintiff ... shall provide for the payment to the plaintiff of
(1) the amount determined to constitute just compensation for that
interest, and (2) a sum equal to the aggregate amount of the costs
and expenses incurred by the plaintiff incident to that action.
(d) As used in this section-
(2) the term "expenses" includes, but is not limited to, a
reasonable attorney's fee incurred incident to the preparation and
trial of such action and the review of any judgment or decree entered
therein, as determined by the court in that action. S. 1351, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) (emphasis added).
128 The provisions of subsection (a) and subsection (c) are identical in-
sofar as completed actions are concerned; subsection (c) simply does not go
on to consider abandonment as does subsection (a). S. 1351, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., (1967).
129 S. 1351, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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demnation action appears to be that such an allowance would en-
courage frivolous litigation.130 This contention is often advanced by
those persons representing agencies that frequently condemn land.13 1
These persons reason that because of the substantial likelihood that
condemnees "could obtain through litigation an award that exceeds
in some amount the highest offer made by the Government, they
would run little risk of having to bear the burden of the proceed-
ing."' 32 They claim that "juries ... tend to regard the highest ap-
praisal introduced in evidence by the Government as a floor, and
the lowest appraisal introduced by the property owner as the ceil-
ing, and to find for the property owner within the range of this
evidence."' 33 And, these representatives of condemning agencies in-
evitably profess to have offered "the maximum amounts justified on
the basis of appraisals."1 34 It is their claim, therefore, that the jury
award usually exceeds "just compensation."
A More Objective Look at Senate Bill 1351
Proponents of Senate Bill 1351 suggest that the reason trial
awards usually exceed the condemnor's offer 135 is that the govern-
ment usually tries to purchase land for less than fair market value. 30
Practicing Oregon attorneys testified at the hearings on Senate Bill
1351 that the Oregon statutes, 37 on which Senate Bill 1351 is based,138
have not raised the level of litigation but, on the contrary, have
lowered it. 1 3D What they have raised, however, is the level of the offer
of the condemnor 40 The reason for this change, the proponents
suggest, is that the condemnee need no longer fear the expenses of
litigation if he is not first offered "just compensation." Rather, under
statutes such as Senate Bill 1351, it is the condemnor that must fear
the costs of the litigation in those cases where "just compensation"
130 See Hearings on S. 1351 at 22-23, 33.
131 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1351 at 51 (letter from Aubrey Wagner,
Chairman of TVA, to Senator James Eastland, April 18, 1968).
132 Hearings on S. 1351 at 51 (letter from Aubrey Wagner, Chairman of
TVA, to Senator James Eastland, April 18, 1968).
133 Hearings on S. 1351 at 50 (letter from Warren Christopher, Deputy
Attorney General, to Senator James Eastland, April 5, 1968).
134 Id.
1385 See note 115 supra.
136 Hearings on S. 1351 at 10 (testimony of Senator Morse); id. at 36
(statement of Gordon Ramstead); see id. at 27 (testimony of Forrest Cooper);
Nassau County Study, supra note 4.
137 ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 20.080, 20.085, 35.105, 35.110, 281.250, 281.330, 281.37U
(1967).
138 Hearings on S. 1351 at 6, 17 (testimony of Senator Wayne Morse).
19 Id. at 31, 33 (testimony of Forrest Cooper); cf. id. at 22-23 (testimony
of Senator Wayne Morse).
140 Id. at 38 (testimony of Gordon Ramstead).
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is not first offered. And, as was suggested in the hearings,14 1 the
prospect of liability for his own costs would clearly deter the con-
demnee from requiring obviously frivolous litigation.
One very valid concern, however, was expressed during the hear-
ings: If attorneys' fees were allowed where there is only a nominal
increase in the award over the offer, frivolous litigation might be
encouraged. 1 42 It was suggested that Senate Bill 1351 be amended,
therefore, to require a one or two percent increase in the award over
the offer before expenses would be allowed. 143 However, a more use-
ful amendment would approach the problem directly and allow re-
covery of the condemnee's expenses as the court, in the interests of
justice, would allow. This approach would permit the trial judge, who
is aware of the facts in each case and better able to determine when
litigation is frivolous, to allow or deny costs where he deems such ac-
tions appropriate. Surely this flexible concept is more desirable, as
it is more likely to lead to a fair result than is a mathematical formula.
In any event, it is axiomatic that there is some price level, what-
ever its relation to fair market value, that will generally satisfy the
condemnee while discouraging frivolous litigation. At present it is
clear that the price level is below fair market value, and below the
constitutionally guaranteed "just, compensation.' 44 Thus, some cor-
rective measure is needed.
Concusiions
Legislation is not easily enacted. It presumably took several cases
of repeatedly abandoned condernhation proceedings before California
enacted section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure.1 45 Fifty-seven
years then passed before that section was amended to provide for the
realities of preparing for- eminent domain litigation.
Only four American jurisdictionsi 46 allow a condemnee to receive
compensation for his attorneys' fees in completed condemnation ac-
tions, even though the award may be several times as great as the
condemnor's last offer. Two-thirds of the states presently allow aban-
donment without any liability on the part of the condemnor for the
condemnee's expenses.
47
In short, American lawmakers have failed to recognize the dis-
141 Id. at 33 (testimony of Forrest Cooper).
142 Id. at 22 (testimony of Senator Wayne Morse); cf. text accompanying
note 133 supra.
148 Id. at 24.
144 Nassau County Study, supra note 4; see note 136 supra.
145 See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
146 These states are Florida, Iowa, North Dakota and Oregon.
147 See note 8 supra.
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tinction between eminent domain and other civil proceedings.14 The
language of the courts to the effect that a condemnee is not receiving
"just compensation" if he has to pay any of his reasonably incurred
costs of litigation,149 is not, in general, reflected in legislation. Factors
such as attorneys' fees often make a substantial difference between
"just compensation" on the one hand and what is equivalent to extor-
tion on the other. Legislation is badly needed. 150
The Model Code and Senate Bill 1351 are both steps in the right
direction. Neither is all-inclusive, and both are doubtless years from
enactment. Even upon enactment, the Senate bill will affect only a
small fraction of the condemnation actions in California. And the
Model Code faces an arduous journey between proposal and adop-
tion by the California legislature. However, California condemnation
law has progressed markedly over the past few decades. It is not un-
likely, therefore, that, with the aid of the above-noted proposed legis-
lation, California will eventually fulfill the constitutional mandate
that the condemnee receive his full measure of "just compensation."
Barry L. Friedman*
148 In La Mesa-Spring Valley School Dist. v. Otsuka, 57 Cal. 2d 309, 316-
17, 369 P.2d 7, 12, 19 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484 (1962), the court, in noting the differ-
ence, said: "It must be kept in mind that attorney's fees in a condemnation
action are in a different category from those in other actions. Eminent do-
main, so far as the defendant is concerned, is not based upon any activity on
his part. There is no voluntary element in such an action. When the public
agency announces its intention to take his property, it is telling the owner that
he must sell his property whether he wants to or not." See generally 4 NIcHOLS
§ 14.249; note 67 supra.
149 See text accompanying notes 66 & 67 supra.
150 Hearings on S. 1351 at 6 (testimony of Senator Wayne Morse); id. at
40 (testimony of Roland Boyd); see id. at 55 (Resolution of the House of
Delegates, ABA).
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